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1 – Introduction 
 
 With Johnson (2000), I take it that the study of argument and argumentation involves two 
basic projects: a descriptive one and an evaluative one.  Following Johnson, I will call these the 
Theory of Analysis and the Theory of Appraisal respectively.  The Theory of Analysis involves 
the empirical study of argument and argumentation. Its basic goals are description and analysis. 
Its counterpart, the Theory of Appraisal, is normative and its basic goals are those of evaluation 
and criticism.  This paper is about the relationship between these two projects. 
 At one level, the relationship between these two theories seems intuitive and obvious: the 
one evaluates what the other describes.2 Yet, contemporary changes in the study of 
argumentation have given rise to significant issues concerning what, exactly, it is that we ought 
to be describing and evaluating in our study of argument. Specifically, these changes have 
focussed on the essentially situated nature of all instances of argument.  The subject-matter of 
our study is no longer seen as an abstract or rarefied product, detached from the real world - or 
worse, as those contrived examples that can be found in logic manuals and early textbooks on 
critical thinking. Rather, we as argumentation theorists ought to be concerned with those actual 
arguments that are really employed in practical, everyday situations. This shift has occasioned a 
re-evaluation of the descriptive models and evaluative theories with which we study argument. 
 
 
2 – Terminology 
 
 In order to highlight this shift in perspective, and to bring into focus the problem that I 
feel it has occasioned, let me set out some terminology. 
 By the term “argument” I mean a set of natural-language declarative sentences, one of 
which is the conclusion, the remainder of which are the premises.  Arguments, on this view, are 
products: they are artefacts, collections of text. 
 Importantly, there may be a variety of non-equivalent arguments supporting some 
specific claim or conclusion. Some of these arguments may be acceptable and some unacceptable 
in relation to some epistemic standard. 
 By the term “argumentation” I mean the activity of arguing - the activity by which 
arguments are transacted.  Clearly, this activity may take many different forms, and (for now) I 
would like to render this activity in its broadest possible sense.  Argumentation may be written or 
spoken or perhaps even take other forms (e.g., visual).  Argumentation may have many 
participants, or may simply involve the activity of an individual reasoner. Where several 
participants are involved, we might say that there is an audience.  Audiences may be one or 
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many and their members may be actively or passively involved in the argumentation.  Finally, 
the goal or purpose of argumentation is to elicit a reasoned change in view (Harman, 1986). 
Again though, the goal of argumentation should be broadly interpreted so as to include activities 
of inquiry as well as persuasion.  (For instance, weighing the evidence for a position and making 
up one’s mind about a view are to be included as well as trying to get an audience to accept some 
claim.)  As such, argumentation need not result in a change in view, though I shall focus 
particularly on cases where it does. 
 Finally, I shall use the phrase “an instance of argumentation” to mean a particular, and 
situated occasion on which one or more specific individuals come to a reasoned change in view 
on the basis of the reasons contained in the argument transacted. 
 
 
3- The Relationship between Argument and Argumentation 
 
 I am now in a position to give a preliminary articulation of the problem that I would like 
to discuss in this paper.  Accepting these definitions, we might observe that “argument is a 
component of argumentation” (Johnson 2000, 13). Arguments are those things that are transacted 
in an instance of argumentation.  For this reason, as Johnson points out, “The theory of argument 
is a component of the theory of argumentation” (ibid.).  While correct, I worry that this attitude is 
dangerously comfortable.  My concern is that this attitude - which I do not see as specific to 
Johnson - carries with it the assumption that by studying argument(s) we are de facto studying 
argumentation.  Yet, while this assumption may well be true in the general case, it is by no 
means true in any particular case.  Rather, establishing its truth in any particular case requires 
additional evidence. (And, if I am correct, this additional evidence may well be rather difficult to 
come by in most situations.) 
 
 
4 - Argumentation Theory: Its Subject-Matter and Goals 
 
 Given the recent shift from abstracted, de-contextualized, and contrived arguments 
towards the study of situated arguments, I assume that the subject-matter of interest to 
argumentation theorists is those arguments that are actually transacted in particular instances of 
argumentation.  The goal, then, of the contemporary study of argumentation - and the study of 
situated, natural arguments - is the study and evaluation of the actual reasons on the basis of 
which particular individuals (rightly or wrongly) come to adopt or assert conclusions, or come to 
reasoned changes in view. The problem is, by what strategy ought we to determine those reasons. 
 
 
5 - Two Observations 
 
 It is precisely in this context that my paper concerns the relationship between the Theory 
of Analysis and the Theory of Appraisal.  On the assumption that the proper subject matter of 
Argumentation Theory is those situated arguments that are actually transacted in particular 
instances of argumentation, two general observations may be made. 
(1) All argument evaluation presupposes an interpretation (or reconstruction). 
The subject matter for the Theory of Appraisal is provided by the Theory of Analysis, and it is 
  2
D. M. Godden’s “Reconstruction and Representation: Deductivism as an Interpretative Strategy” 
only after the descriptive project has been successfully completed that the evaluative project may 
begin.  
(2) Any failure of the reconstructive project in producing a representative interpretation 
brings about a failure of the evaluative project. 
The reason here should be obvious.  We can only determine whether A’s reasons for C are good 
to the extent that we have a representative picture of A’s reasons.  Should we fail to produce an 
accurate interpretation of A’s argument, then any subsequent evaluation will not be relevant.
 When combined in this context, these observations reveal a crucial feature of the 
relationship between the Theory of Analysis and the Theory of Assessment.  It is not just that the 
descriptive project is temporally prior to the evaluative one.  Rather, the descriptive project must 
be completely independent from the evaluative one that is, they must be conducted 
independently form one another. 
 Yet, in my view, the rigorous separation of the Theory of Appraisal from the Theory of 
Analysis has not been standardly maintained, and the need for this separation has not been 
widely recognized in the current study of argument. In the remainder of this paper, I consider 
reconstructive deductivism as it pertains to the theoretical concerns sketched above.  I argue that 
deductivism does not respect the boundary between the descriptive and evaluative phases of the 
study of argument, and as such that it cannot be seen as offering an effective interpretive 
strategy. 
 
 
6 - Deductivism  
 
 It is sometimes said that deductivism is the thesis that  
[D1] “All good arguments are deductively valid” (Groarke1992, 113). 
This is a thesis about the proper standards of evidence by which arguments should be evaluated. 
As such, it is a thesis belonging to the Theory of Appraisal.  Presumably it means that the only 
acceptable link between the premises and the conclusion of an argument is one whereby it is not 
logically possible for the conclusion to be false given the truth of the premises.  The only good 
arguments are those for which no counter-example is to be found, irrespective of the plausibility 
of that counter-example. 
 Before proceeding to my own consideration of deductivism, I would like to recognize 
those objections that are typically raised against it in the literature.  The standard objections to 
deductivism (as identified by Groarke, 1992 and Gerritsen, 1994, and attributed to authors like 
ovier, 1987) are three: G 
(i) Deductivism does not allow for differing degrees of evidential support between premises 
and conclusions; 
(ii) Deductivism either fails to provide an account of fallacies, or provides an incorrect 
account of fallacies; and finally, 
(iii) Deductivism does not provide a defensible interpretive strategy for describing the 
structure of natural language arguments. 
Given my concern with deductivism as an interpretive strategy, I am primarily interested in the 
third objection on this list. Yet, any discussion of deductivism as an interpretive thesis must 
consider deductivism as an evaluative thesis. 
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7 - Deductivism and Theory of Appraisal 
 
 One way to justify deductivism as a Theory of Analysis is to assert deductivism as a 
Theory of Appraisal. On this point Govier writes, “The crucial point of deductivism is that 
anything less than a relation of entailment between premises and conclusion is unsatisfactory.  
On this theory, there are absolutely no degrees or kinds of logical support” (Govier 1987, 23).   
In this respect, the two questions that deductivism asks of any argument are 1) Are the premises 
of the argument true (or perhaps acceptable)?  And 2) Does the conclusion follow from the 
premises? 
 The standard that deductivism upholds is that of validity.  Informally, an argument is 
valid if and only if it is not logically possible for the conclusion to be false given the truth of the 
premises (Groarke 1992, 113).  That is, the assumption that all of the premises of an argument 
are true is inconsistent with the assumption that its conclusion is false - it results in a (formal or 
material) contradiction.  
 
 
8 - Standards of Evidence 
 
 Yet, there are a variety of non-equivalent standards of evidence. One way of 
characterizing the standard of evidence embodied in deductivism is to say that, accepting the 
premises of the argument, we should accept its conclusion if there is no counter-example to be 
found for the argument in question.  Yet, any number of other standards of evidence might be 
articulated in just this way. Consider the following list: 
Accepting the premises of the argument, we should accept its conclusion if  
• the only counter-examples to be found are highly improbable, or  
• the only counter-examples to be found are less probable than the premises, or  
• no counter-example has been found yet (it has not been falsified),  
• no counter-example is already to be found amongst our beliefs (coherence). 
These standards are given in descending order, so that arguments meeting a higher standard will 
also meet the lower standard, while arguments that fail to meet a higher standard may well meet 
a lower standard.   
 The fact is, then, that there are a plurality of non-equivalent standards of evidence. In 
view of this, deductivism as an evaluative thesis cannot be accepted on the grounds that there are 
no other standards of evidence.  As a result, deductivism as an interpretative thesis cannot be 
accepted a priori for purely normative reasons since arguers may be attempting to meet some 
lesser standard of evidence in their acts of arguing.   For example, it is not justifiable to invoke 
the Principle of Charity as a justification for interpreting a situated argument as deductive 
without some additional evidence that the arguers are indeed trying to meet the deductive 
standard of evidence.  Since the arguers may be aiming at some lesser standard of evidence, to 
apply the deductive standard might easily involve attributing to those arguers a stronger position 
than the one that they are arguing for, and this would constitute a fallacious misrepresentation of 
their position.  
 Deductivism as an interpretive strategy, then, cannot be justified on the grounds that it is 
the only standard of evidence.  Instead, the success of deductivism as an evaluative thesis 
epends on one or more of the following issues: d 
(a) whether deductivism represents a standard of evidence to which all other standards of 
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evidence are reducible,  
(b) whether arguers are, in fact, attempting to meet the standard of evidence embodied in the 
rules of deduction (or that they ought to be), or finally,  
(c) whether deductivism represents a standard of evidence in which theorists ought to take a 
particular interest. 
In the remainder of the paper, I consider each of these options in turn. 
 
 
9 - The Reducibility of Other Standards of Evidence to Deductivism  
 
 Some arguments for deductivism as an interpretive thesis may be read as claiming that all 
standards of evidence reduce to the deductive standard.  Even though there are other standards of 
evidence, they may be represented on a deductive model, and as such they are effectively 
reducible to the deductive standard of evidence.  
I claim, though, that non-deductive standards of evidence cannot be reduced to the 
deductive standard, and as such that non-deductive arguments cannot be represented accurately 
on a deductive model.  To see this, consider the following two examples. 
 Example #1 - Consider a version of Kyburg’s (1961) lottery paradox where there are 
1,000 tickets in a lottery in which 1 ticket is guaranteed to win.  Since we can say of each 
individual ticket that it is highly probable (99.9%) that it will not win, we could deduce (using 
the usual rules for conjunction and quantification) that it is highly probable that no ticket will 
win.  But, we know that this is false; indeed it is certain that one ticket will win, hence the 
paradox. 
 Example # 2 - It is more likely than not that a person born in Scotland will have red hair.  
It is more likely than not that a person born with red hair will have green eyes.  So, it is more 
likely than not that a person born in Scotland will have green eyes.  This argument is clearly 
invalid. Further, it remains invalid when we substitute qualifiers like probable, plausible, or  
likely.3 I further omit normative (evaluative) qualifiers like reasonable to accept since the criteria 
for acceptability will be given in relation to some standard of evidence. 
 These examples are meant to show that deductive standards preserve truth and certainty; 
they do not preserve plausibility, probability, or likelihood.   As such, I argue that non-deductive 
standards of evidence cannot be reduced to deductive ones.  
 
 
10 - Deductivism as a Reconstructive Strategy 
 
 So far, I have sought to establish that deductivism as a Theory of Analysis cannot be 
supported on the grounds that it is a universal Theory of Appraisal.  There are other standards of 
evidence which are neither equivalent nor reducible to the deductive standard. 
In recognizing the failures of these attempts, we have each time been pointed towards the 
arguers as the source of the information that could authorize our interpretations of situated 
arguments. Indeed, Vorobej observes the curiosity of the omission of an appeal to this source 
when he writes: 
 
It is more or less standard practice to assume that the author of an argument is the 
best authority when it comes to identifying the premises and conclusions of his 
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argument.  Yet, curiously, time and again, accounts of critical thinking ... fail to 
address the third question of the strength of the logical link between the premises 
and the conclusion from the author’s perspective (Vorobej 1992, 106). 
 
Within deductivism moves of this sort are strongly resisted. Deductivists frequently claim that 
the theorist is not obliged to inquire after arguers intentions (or any other psychological data 
about the arguer) because it is sufficient to instead study the arguer’s commitments.
 In reply to this type of argument, it should be admitted that arguers are committed to the 
view that their premises justify (i.e., are good reasons for) their conclusions.  But since the nature 
of a good reason is properly seen in the context of a particular standard of evidence, it does not 
follow that arguers are committed to providing deductively good reasons. The point is that the 
commitments of arguers ought to be determined in relation to the standard of evidence at which 
they are (or ought to be) aiming, and this has to be determined by (psychological) facts about the 
arguer. 
 
 
11 - Deductivism, Truth and Certainty Revisited 
 
 This brings me to the last reason that one might be justified in seeking to render an 
argument as deductive.  One might want to interpret an argument as deductive because one has a 
particular theoretical interest in those ‘properties’ which are preserved in deductivist standards of 
evidence - truth and certainty.  In this context, it is always appropriate to ask whether some 
argument can be given an interpretation according to which that argument meets a certain 
standard of evidence. 
 Moreover, the significance of any such critical inquiry is not entirely a function of  
the descriptive accuracy of its analytical model.  For example, if a particular argument is 
incapable of establishing the truth of its conclusion, then this normative fact about the 
argument may be of theoretical interest independently of whether the standard of truth is 
an important goal of the producers and consumers of that particular argument.  
Conversely, merely because a theorist can evaluate an argument according to a particular 
standard, this alone is insufficient to make such an evaluation relevant to a particular 
argumentative exchange.  
 So, theorists may choose to adopt any standard in which they have an interest when 
evaluating an argument.  The merits of such an investigation will rest, in part, on the nature of 
those standards.  But, they will also rest on the relevance of those standards to the goals of other 
theorists and the arguers themselves. 
 
 
12 – Conclusion 
 
 The kernel of this paper is that to the degree that Argumentation Theorists are interested 
in the analysis and evaluation of situated instances of argumentation, the standards and norms of 
evaluation that are applied in the Theory of Appraisal must remain completely independent of 
the Theory of Analysis. The analysis of argument does not imply a universal standard of 
assessment, nor does it presuppose any one particular standard of evidence.  Indeed, the very 
attempt to import normative aspects of the Theory of Appraisal into the process of analysis 
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stands in immediate jeopardy of rendering the interpretation unrepresentative. Because of this, 
the Theory of Appraisal must be rigorously separated from the Theory of Analysis.  Theories 
which fail to mark this distinction steadfastly cannot offer accuracy in their interpretations or 
relevance in their evaluations. 
 
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                          
1  The author would like to recognize the contributions of R.C. Pinto and Erik C.W. Krabbe to 
this paper, and to thank them for their help in this regard. 
 Research for this paper was made possible by grants from the Social Science and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada, Ontario Graduate Scholarship and McMaster 
University. 
 
2  As Pinto pointed out to me (R. Pinto, Letter to D. Godden, Unpublished correspondence, June 
5, 2001). 
 
3  I omit the qualifier possible, since we have a well-developed modal logic that is capable of 
rendering the formal structure or arguments using this term. 
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